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The Constitution as an Instrument
of Public Welfare
By WALTON H. HAMILTON
T HE very phrase "The Constitution as an Instrument of Public
Welfare" would seem an anomaly. It implies that a clash in
values can arise between the Constitution of the United States and
that thing called "public welfare." Now it was an axiom of the un-
dergraduate political science courses to which I was exposed, that
the Constitution is an instrument of government and the object of
government is to serve the "public welfare." So the fact that there
can be a clash between the document itself and the thing it serves is
per se a challenge. That the question is raised at all seems to me to
indicate that we are face to face with one of our most significant
problems. It is one of the many great problems that have arisen in
what that philosopher Mr. Thomas Jefferson would call "the course
of human events." And due to the fact that the world in which we
live and the ideas within our heads belong to the twentieth century,
there may be a bit of the taint of our own times in some of the
contemporary discussion of the Constitution.
As a way of approach to the subject I wish to touch upon each
of three things: First, the Constitution as a document; second, the
Constitution as an institution; and thirdly, Constitutionality as a
way of thought.
The Constitution as a document was drawn up in 1787, which
is a great many more decades ,away than some chronologists would
have it, and paradoxically much. nearer to some of us, in terms of
opinion, than most of the construers of the Constitution are willing
to admit. It is hard now to recapture the "climate of opinion" which
prevailed at that time, and almost impossible to discover the secrets
of the discussions that took place while the convention was meeting
during that hot summer of 1787. As we all know, James Madison
greatly changed his views in the course of his life, and his Journal
of the Convention, the most complete written record of what took
place, represents to a very large extent what Madison came to believe
rather than what the youthful Madison, who sat in that Convention,
felt.
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Then too it is almost impossible for us to read ancient documents
and get from them the meaning of those who drew them. Words
pass somewhat uncertainly between us currently. And words pass
even more uncertainly between decades. For example, I have taken
a sample, ancient and modern, of meaning of the words in the phrase
"Commerce among the several States," which, of course, just now is
of significance. I went through all of the English dictionaries in the
Library of Congress that were published from 1725 to 1787, and
looked at the meanings of four words, "trade," "industry," "busi-
ness," and "commerce." "Trade" during that century had ceased to
be a "craft" and was being applied to any economic occupation. The
word "industry" was used mainly in the sense of being industrious
and applied to any kind of beneficial labor. It was quite devoid of
meaning in the sense in which we refer to national industrial prob-
lems. More than half of the dictionaries omitted the word "busi-
ness" entirely, and when it was given, used it wholly in the sense of
a peculiar, or personal, interest and occupation. "I must be about
my Master's business" explains the usage-there is no hint of any
other meaning for this word at that time.
The only word of these four which was used that has any rela-
tionship whatever to our present world of interlocked production and
distribution is the word "commerce." And "commerce" was used
in the sense of having any conversation, correspondence, or inter-
course with another person. Also it was used in the more general
sense of dealing in, or with, any goods or commodities. In the eight-
eenth century "commerce" was the word corresponding to our mod-
ern word "business" or "industry." I could not find in a single dic-
tionary any indication that the word meant movement of goods-
there was no hint of "stream" or "flow of commerce" in 1787. And
yet that is the criterion, now used more frequently than any other,
by which the United States Supreme Court interprets the phrase
"commerce among the several states." This I submit as a mere
sample of the great contrast between ways of thought existing in
1787 and 1936. A comprehensive and diligent inquiry is absolutely
necessary to recapture the "climate of opinion" and catch the impli-
cations which were written into the words of the late eighteenth
century.
It is not surprising that even in law schools today the instinctive
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reaction of an individual, when faced with a question of "Constitu-
tionality," is to go to the reported cases. The suggestion that a stu-
dent should go to the Constitution itself, would be taken as a novel
idea. The text is there but to a very large extent the meaning that
underlies the text is completely lost. The Constitution as we know
it simply uses the document of 1787 as a spring board. What was
set down as interpretation becomes the basis for later decisions.
We have all come across the weighty tomes that interpret the lines
of Shakespeare's plays, and have been amused at the footnotes on
footnotes that explained other footnotes. The Bible too has been
generously interpolated. Each age reads into the same lines new
and varied meanings and revises the meanings discovered by the pre-
ceding age to suit itself. Gloss is laid upon gloss; interpretation
piled upon interpretation. So it appears to me the Constitution of
1936 simply uses the document of 1787 as one of its raw materials.
Our Constitution is really a collection of slowly changing institu-
tional and intellectual usages. The words are carried over, the
meaning that lives in these words is subject to constant change.
Probably one of the most dramatic instances of this change is
seen in the history of the expression "due process of law." Origi-
nally written into the Bill of Rights, and again written into the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the phrase had simply to do with
procedure and nothing else. That was the assumption on the part
of those who, after the Civil War, tried to protect and insure the
rights of the Negro against his ex-masters. Later Roscoe Conkling
denied this and insisted that there was another purpose, but this
looks suspiciously like rationalization on his part. In the first case
of importance involving the clause it was invoked to protect the
southern whites against carpet-bag legislatures. To Mr. Justice
Campbell, a Jeffersonian Democrat of the old school, it was a grand
opportunity to insert the rights of man-"life, liberty, and pursuit of
happiness"-into the Constitution, but later the rights of man were
commuted into the privileges of corporations against social legisla-
tion, despite the fact that the corporation was a creature of the State
and possessed, in its early history, no rights save those with which
the State endowed it.
The change came gradually, of course, and it was not until 1887
that we find the first clear-cut declaration of the immunity of cor-
norations from regulations under the "due process clause." It was
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imported as a doctrine into the instrument just before the close of
the century and has enjoyed little more than four decades of his-
tory, but from 1888 to 1918 it was invoked in 790 cases before the
Supreme Court. And here again we see an indication of the proc-
ess through which usages grow up into what is called a "living con-
stitution." That the "due process" clause could be embedded prac-
tically unnoticed in the Constitution itself for seventy years and then
become a controlling factor in constitutional law shows quite clearly
that though we have, in contrast to England, a written constitution,
that document of 1787 is in the main merely the raw material for
the social and intellectual formulas of 1936.
Finally, in considering the Constitution as an institution, we may
notice a development of the last two years. The country has been
subject to a more violent attack of constitutionalism than has been
seen since the Civil War. It is not the Constitution. It is the use of
the Constitution as a fetish.
Three years ago the people most concerned in industry were
shouting wildly that national legislation in regard to the country's
industry was imperative. Today, trade and industry must be left to
the states for regulation. States' rights, moribund for all practical
purposes since Lee's surrender at Appomattox, have again become
the palladium of our liberty and happiness. The words are mouthed
with a tieological intonation.
"States' Rights must be preserved!" The Constitution must not
be tampered with! It has assumed a semi-divine character as though
it had been handed down from Sinai-a character which would have
astonished the young men who wrote, it. For the "Founding Fa-
thers," whose average age was only 44 years at the time of the Con-
vention-and among whom were men in their twenties-had little
reverence for divinity in government. They had all shared in punc-
turing the fallacy of a divine right in kings. That their work in
Philadelphia should be clothed with the same sanction would have
amused them no end.
In conclusion, I feel that in regard to the immediate future, and
to the various issues which will presently be before the court, that
Constitutionality as a way of thinking offers an answer. The Su-
preme Court will serve as well as any other instrument in solving
the problems of national regulation of national industry, social secur-
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ity legislation and other kindred issues. What is constitutional and
what is not, however, will depend more upon the gloss than upon the
text. The question, moreover, is not what either the Constitution or
the former decisions force the Court to do. The question is very
largely what the Court is going to decide to do in the matter. Mr.
Justice Holmes, just before his resignation, was hearing a case in
which a lawyer closed his pleading with: "May it please your Hon-
ors, you must decide in favor of my client, or go back on every one
of your former decisions." Mr. Justice Holmes gently replied, "But
Mr. H-, if I were you I would not worry. It seems to me that the
ingenuity, even of this Court, can rise to that occasion."
After the United States Supreme Court had outlawed a statute
of the State of New Jersey because fees of employment agencies
were regulated, within three years the same Court decided to sustain
an Act that regulated the fees of insurance companies to their agents.
Ingeniously, the Court commented on the second case, saying, "This
Court presumes that a state act is constitutional. That presumption
can be overcome by a record of fact showing that the evil did not
exist or the remedy is not an appropriate one." The Court's inge-
nuity, also, easily overcame the objections by Arizona to Federal
authority in the construction of Boulder Dam. The Court found
Federal authority under Congress' power over navigable waters.
Now the Colorado River is not navigable in the ordinary sense. But
there was a period in the past when the river was navigable (for
canoes) and through some technological change, said the Court,
which may occur in the future, it may again become navigable.
It's very like the story in which the little boy objected to Uncle
Remus that rabbits could not climb trees. Uncle Remus replied that
on this occasion the rabbit was "bliged" to climb a tree, for other-
wise he could not have escaped Brer Fox. Certainly the ingenuity
of the Court can rise to the occasion. The question is not whether
the Court can if it will, but rather whether the nine Justices will
when they can. A plausible constitutional argument can be written
on both side by any second year law student. Any argument, of
course, must rest on its presumption and presumptions for the most
part will be founded upon things that really cannot be disputed about.
So the question as a question resolves itself into one of the Judicial
Will.
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